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The Constitutional Implications Of Discovery
Practice In Quasi-Criminal Prosecutions In Illinois
QUASI-CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS:
DISCOVERY ONLY BY LEAVE OF COURT
Prosecutions for municipal ordinance violations in Illinois place
defendants in a most precarious position. The courts of the state
have consistently adhered to the long-standing principle that such
offenses are "quasi-criminal," being civil in form, but criminal in
character.) The nature of the offense has overtones of a criminal
violation, a wrong against the public; but as incarceration is not a
possible sanction, the form of proceeding governing the adjudication
of a quasi-criminal prosecution is essentially that of a civil trial. The
dual aspects of this nomenclature have created serious procedural
problems, particularly in the area of pre-trial discovery.
It would seem logical to expect that since municipal ordinance
violations are regarded as civil in form, such proceedings and avail-
able discovery devices should be governed by the provisions of the
Civil Practice Act' or, alternatively, being criminal in nature, by the
rules governing criminal procedure. 3 Unfortunately, this is not the
case. The quasi-criminal classification has effectively removed pros-
ecutions of this nature from the body of rules governing both civil
and criminal discovery.
A 1970 amendment to the Illinois Municipal Code provided that
all municipal prosecutions imposing possible jail sentences upon
conviction are to be governed by the rules of criminal procedure.,
This amendment had no effect, however, upon defendants facing
charges for which the penalty consists of a fine only. In a quasi-
criminal prosecution punishable by the imposition of a fine, the
defendant is not entitled to any discovery provisions as a matter of
right, under either the civil or criminal rules. The present state of
1. Wiggins v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill. 372 (1873).
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 (1973). The applicability of the act is defined in § 1, which, in
pertinent part, reads:
The provisions of this Act apply to all civil proceedings" both at law and in equity,
except . . . other proceedings in which the procedure is regulated by separate
statutes.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 401-500 (1973). The applicability of the Rules is defined
in § 411 which, in pertinent part, reads:
These rules shall be applied in all criminal cases wherein the accused is charged
with an offense for which, upon conviction, he might be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-2-1.1 (1973).
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the law permits discovery only by leave of court; the defendant is
limited to those devices made available at the judge's discretion.
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed this rule in City of Dan-
ville v. Hartshorn,I holding that the right of the defendant to obtain
pre-trial discovery in quasi-criminal cases is solely within the discre-
tion of the trial court. A defendant must move the court for permis-
sion to obtain discovery and will be limited to those devices, if any,
which the trial judge deems appropriate under the circumstances of
the case.
The limitation on the scope of discovery in quasi-criminal prose-
cutions is a decision of policy. The judiciary has taken the position
that the taking of property in the form of a fine should not be
afforded the same privileges and protections that are given as a
matter of right in civil litigation or when the possibility of impri-
sonment exists. Further inquiry, however, reveals that this ap-
proach may be short-sighted, because collateral consequences result
from conviction under a quasi-criminal ordinance.'
The rationale underlying the policy is purely practical: due to the
proliferation of this type of prosecution, it is in the best interest of
justice to provide a method for the expedient disposition of such
cases.7 The question arises as to whether or not this policy leads to
a truly just disposition and whether it affords a defendant his con-
stitutional guarantees of fair trial. The Hartshorn rule may very well
place expediency above justice.
The problems created by the hybrid nature of quasi-criminal of-
fenses were considered by the Study Committee on Procedures in
Quasi-Criminal and Ordinance Violation Cases8 during the 1975
meeting of the Illinois Judicial Conference. The Committee, in its
report, recognized the inadequacy of the current state of the law in
this area:
[Quasi-criminal] proceedings are governed by a unique procedure
which is embodied only in a confusing body of case law and miscel-
laneous statutory provisions. Because of the uncodified nature of
quasi-criminal procedure, there is no clear, authoritative guideline
for the trial judge to follow . . . . [Tihe net result is a wide
5. 53 111. 2d 399, 292 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
6. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). See notes 57 through 71 infra.
7. People v. Finley, 21 111. App. 3d 335, 315 N.E.2d 229 (1974).
8. ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (1975), ASSOCIATE JUDGE SEMINAR ADVANCED READING
MATERIAL, REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURES IN QUASI-CRIMINAL AND ORDINANCE
VIOLATION CASES, 42-66, (1975) [hereinafter cited as ILNoIs JUDICIAL CONFERENCE].
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variance in the practice among the various courts throughout the
state.9
This statement, however, appears to understate the problem. The
allowance of total judicial discretion on the issue of discovery in
quasi-criminal prosecutions may lend itself not only to variances
among the State's courts, but also to arbitrary and discriminatory
practices within courts of the same district or even among different
defendants before the same judge.
The committee's report deals largely with ambiguities arising in
the area of discovery and proposed adoption of the following rule:
Rule 241 Definition of a Civil Offense
For the purposes of Rule 241 through 251, a civil offense is a
violation of any ordinance enacted by a county, city, [or] town
. . . which ordinance is punishable by fine only. Unless otherwise
specifically provided . . . these rules shall govern procedures for
the trial of civil offenses. Procedures for which, upon conviction,
the accused might be imprisoned shall be governed by the Code of
Criminal Procedure. 0
This proposed rule is but little improvement. Further reading of the
committee's comments indicates that the purpose of Rule 241 is to
codify the common law doctrine confirmed in the Hartshorn" deci-
sion, i.e., discovery in cases where the only sanction is a fine is to
be permitted solely by leave of court. Defendants facing possible
prison or jail sentences, however, would receive criminal discovery
rights. 2 The inequities perpetuated by the quasi-criminal classifica-
tion for fine-only prosecutions would still remain, as defendants
would continue to be faced with an undefined and purely discretion-
ary scope of discovery.
This article suggests that the limited scope and arbitrary applica-
tion of discovery rules in quasi-criminal prosecutions is an infringe-
ment upon the due process and equal protection rights of defen-
dants. Municipalities have a legitimate interest in establishing rules
for judicial proceedings, but this interest must be balanced against
the rights of individuals to liberty and property.
The power of the trial court to allow or disallow discovery in
quasi-criminal prosecutions appears to be inconsistent with recent
United States Supreme Court decisions in the due process and equal
9. Id. at 43-44.
10. Id. at 47.
11. 53 Ill. 2d 399, 292 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 411-415 (1973).
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protection areas.' 3 These deicisions have established a definite trend
towards extending these rights in two ways: first, by affording defen-
dants greater and more defined rights in procedural matters," and
second, by tipping the scales in favor of individual rights in the
absence of a clear and convincing legitimate state interest.' 5
These problems can be illustrated by a comparison of the re-
stricted scope of discovery in quasi-criminal cases with the discov-
ery provisions applicable to prosecutions for felonies and misde-
meanors, and these applicable to civil litigation.
CIVIL PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY: RELEVANT INFORMATION AIDS THE TRUTH
SEEKING PROCESS
Civil discovery rules were established for the benefit of the liti-
gants and trial court alike. The Supreme Court of Illinois gave ex-
pression to this sentiment in Stimpert v. A bdnour, 8 stating that the
Supreme Court Rules17 manifested legislative intent to broaden the
scope of pre-trial discovery. The ultimate function of the trial court
is to provide an arena where litigants will receive a fair and just
determination of disputes. In addition, the discovery rules were de-
signed to provide for efficiency as well as fairness. All litigants in
civil cases are entitled to the rights and privileges of these rules as
a matter of right.
The principle underlying pre-trial discovery in civil cases is that
legal disputes are more fairly decided when each party enters the
13. For example, in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), an indigent defendant
obtained reversal of his conviction, on equal protection grounds, as the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the trial judge should not have denied the defendant appointment of counsel on
appeal merely because he felt there was "no good reason" for the appeal. Also, in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), although the court refused to set up strict guidelines for determin-
ing whether the defendant's due process right to speedy trial was violated, it did list factors
to be considered: length and reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of rights, and possibil-
ity of resulting prejudice. These cases illustrate that the Supreme Court believes that the
establishment of some criteria to circumscribe the trial judge's discretion is a necessity when
dealing with equal protection and due process rights.
14. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
15. In Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), the Court held that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment guaranteed the defendant the right to reciprocal discovery and
that this safeguard must be incorporated into a state's alibi rule. In the state court, the
defendant was denied the right to present his alibi evidence because he refused to provide
the state with a list of witnesses, claiming the state's rule was unconstitutional as it provided
for no reciprocity. See also People v. Jarrett, 22 Ill. App. 3d 61, 316 N.E.2d 659 (1974).
16. 24 Ill. 2d 26, 179 N.E.2d 602 (1962).
17. ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 110A (1973).
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trial aided by as much relevant information as possible without
prejudicing the rights and privileges of the other."
There are, however, limitations placed upon discovery in civil
cases, as the trial judge has authority to deny pre-trial discovery
requests. This is in great contrast to quasi-criminal prosecutions,
where discovery is allowed only by leave of court. In civil cases, the
bounds of the trial judge's discretion are adequately defined by an
existing body of recent and uniform decisions which have inter-
preted many of the civil discovery rules. In quasi-criminal cases,
however, a defendant is provided with no right to any pre-trial dis-
covery. It is entirely within the discretion of the court whether to
grant discovery at all. Moreover, there is no body of case law defin-
ing the scope of this discretion.
The general rule applicable to civil discovery in Illinois is that
everything is discoverable if it is relevant to the issues properly
provable in the case at bar and not privileged. 9 Constraints upon
the discretion of a trial judge are provided by decisions which define
privileges and which act to guide the judge in the disposition of a
discovery motion.
The role of the trial judge in ruling upon a motion to obtain
discovery over objection is two-fold. He must first decide if the
matter in question is relevant to a genuine material issue sought to
be proven; further, relevancy considerations aside, the court may
still deny the motion if the request violates a privilege created by
law or statute.
Under these criteria, the plantiff's request for car model produc-
tion records for a period including model years 1960-65 was denied
in People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua,20 when the issue of
liability concerned only a defective 1961 model in an auto collison.
The court reasoned that records for the time period requested were
not relevant to the issue of liability.
The second tier of this test focuses on the question of privilege.
Interpretations of what constitutes the attorney-client and work
product privileges were provided, respectively, by the cases of Day
v. Illinois Power Company2' and Monier v. Chamberlain.21
The foregoing decisions greatly limit arbitrary application of dis-
18. Drehle v. Fleming, 129 Ill. App. 2d 166, 263 N.E.2d 348 (1970).
19. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 fll. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
20. 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967). See also Reske v. Klein, 33 111. App. 2d 302, 179
N.E.2d 415 (1961), which dealt with interrogatories lacking the specificity required to enable
the court to determine relevancy.
21. 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964).
22. 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
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covery rules and provide a standard for appellate review of discre-
tionary abuse. Discovery motions will be denied when the requested
information is irrelevant or would violate the privileges of the oppos-
ing party.
The courts have thus effectuated the policy underlying the Su-
preme Court's discovery rules in civil cases. Parties are aided by the
discovery of all relevant information necessary to present their case
at trial, and limited only by objectively applied rules of exclusion.
This same policy-oriented approach is also evidenced in the area of
discovery under criminal procedure.
CRIMINAL PRE-TRIAL DIscovERY: A SAFEGUARD AGAINST UNFAIR
SURPRISE AND PREJUDICE
Felonies
The defendant in a quasi-criminal prosecution is not entitled, as
a matter of right, to the benefits and safeguards of the criminal
discovery rules.2 3 The duality issue, therefore, has been decided
against the defendant on both fronts, civil and criminal.24 This situ-
ation is particularly alarming in light of the basic concept underly-
ing the right of discovery in criminal prosecutions.
Criminal discovery is geared toward the protection of the defen-
dant. Its purpose is to provide him with all reasonable safeguards
to ensure against unfair surprise, and to bring all otherwise relevant
material before the court for a just determination of guilt or inno-
cence.
A defendant's right to discovery in a criminal prosecution is gov-
erned by Supreme Court Rules 411 - 415. These rules are deemed
applicable
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 411-415 (1973). These discovery devices are granted to the
defendant as a matter of right, while others, enumerated in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412(h)
(1973) are granted at the discretion of the court. The statute provides that:
Upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense, and if the request
is reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure. . . not covered by
this rule.
24. Juvenile proceedings are a good illustration of the problems created when a case falls
somewhere in between the provisions governing civil and criminal cases. In People ex rel.
Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 111. 2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1 (1971), a juvenile defendant facing charges for
rape and robbery claimed entitlement to civil discovery, as prosecutions under the Juvenile
Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-1 et seq. (1973) were civil in nature. The court of
review rejected his argument and held that juvenile delinquencey proceedings were neither
civil nor criminal. The trial judge was left with complete discretion regarding allowable
discovery in order to create a balance between the interests of both the minor and the
community at large. The trial judge granted defendant's motion for discovery, but the case
was remanded because he did so under the misconception of automatic application and not
on the basis of discretion.
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in all criminal cases wherein the accused is charged with an offense
for which, upon conviction, he might be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary 5
Under these rules, the state is required upon motion made by a
criminal defendant, to disclose an enumerated list of information
and, in addition, any other matter which the court, in its discretion,
deems relevant and necessary. 2 These provisions apply to all defen-
dants in felony cases, and to a limited extent,2 to misdemeanor
defendants and to defendants in ordinance violations as defined by
the 1970 amendment to the Illinois Municipal Code. 28
Also, as provided for in civil discovery, the rules limit disclosure
if the court, in its discretion, finds that such would violate some area
of privilege or is otherwise contrary to principles of justice .2
The paramount consideration accorded to protection of the rights
of defendants in felony cases was illustrated in People v. Jarrett,5
where the defendant appealed a conviction for theft and burglary,
claiming that the state failed to give notice of their intent to call
witnesses in rebuttal to his alibi.31 The court addressed the issue of
whether the actions of the state constituted a denial of reciprocal
discovery, causing unfair prejudice against the defendant and
thereby necessitating remand for a new trial. 32
The court, deciding in the defendant's favor, held that although
there is no requirement for a party to divulge the time at which, or
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 411 (1973).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412 (1973).
27. See note 34 infra.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-2-1.1 (1973).
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412(i) (1973) provides:
(i) Denial of disclosure. The court may deny disclosure authorized by this rule and
Rule 413 if it finds that there is a substantial risk to any person of physical harm,
intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or unnecessary annoyance or embarrass-
ment resulting from such disclosure which outweighs any usefulness of the disclo-
sure to counsel.
30. 22 Ill. App. 3d 61, 316 N.E.2d 659 (1974). See also People v. Mourning, 27 Il. App.
3d 414, 327 N.E.2d 279 (1975); People v. White, 123 Ill. App. 2d 102, 259 N.E.2d 357 (1970).
31. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-14 (1973), which required defendant to give notice of
intent to present alibi defense at least five days before trial. This statute was held unconstitu-
tional in People v. Cline, 19 111. App. 2d 466, 311 N.E.2d 599 (1974), affd., 60 111. 2d 561, 328
N.E.2d 534 (1975).
32. The defendant in Jarrett also claimed that the Illinois alibi rule was unconstitutional
on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470 (1973), but this contention was rejected. But see note 31 supra. The defendant prevailed
because the court found that the state failed to comply with the rule itself as interpreted by
the court in People v. Manley, 19 Il1. App. 3d 365, 311 N.E.2d 593 (1974), and not on the
basis of the rule's unconstitutionality.
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capacity in which, he intends to use a witness at trial," there is a
continuing obligation to disclose the identity of a witness once an
intent to call that witness is formulated." The court emphasized the
necessity of maintaining strict safeguards in order to protect the
defendant against unfair surprise and prejudice.3 1 When the actions
of the state amount to an infringement upon the discovery rights of
a criminal defendant, as illustrated in Jarrett, there may be grounds
for reversible error. The defendant has absolute rights to discovery,
limited only in specific instances and expandible by judicial discre-
tion. This situation also exists, to a modified extent, in prosecutions
for misdemeanors in Illinois.
Misdemeanors
A misdemeanor in Illinois is defined as:
any offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisionment in
other than a penitentiary for less than one year may be imposed.3 1
Defendants in these prosecutions are entitled to discovery, as a
matter of right, under the rule adopted in People v. Schmidt. 37 The
trial judge in this case excluded evidence against the defendant
when the state refused to comply with a pre-trial discovery order.
The defendant was prosecuted for operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated,u an offense which carried a fine, but no possible sanc-
tion of imprisonment. He was therefore restricted to those discovery
devices provided by statute and case law in misdemeanor prosecu-
tions. 9
The trial judge extended the scope of discovery in anticipation of
the eventual automatic application of the criminal discovery rules'
to misdemeanor cases; in addition, the court believed that the
33. People v. Manley held that Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(i) required that the state must
produce a list of intended witnesses without reference to the time a party intends to call them
whether in chief or rebuttal. 19 Ill. App. 3d 365, 371, 311 N.E.2d 593, 598 (1974).
34. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 415(b) (1973).
35. 22 IIl. App. 3d at 64, 316 N.E.2d at 661.
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-11 (1973).
37. 8 Ill App. 3d 1024, 291 N.E.2d 225 (1972). In misdemeanor cases, the state requires
that the defendant be furnished the following discovery as a matter of right: (1) a list of
witnesses, ILL. REv. STAT. ch 38, § 114-9, (1973); (2) any confessions by the defendant regard-
ing his guilt or innocence, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-10, (1973); (3) in cases involving the
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the results of a breathalyzer test, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 11-501(g). People v. Finley, 21 Ill. App. 3d 335, 315 N.E.2d 229 (1974).
38. ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 95-/2, § 11-501(g) (1973).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-9 and 10, ch. 95-1/2, § 11-501(g) (1973). People v. Finley,
21 Ill.App. 3d 335, 315 N.E.2d 229 (1974).
40. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1l0A, §§ 411-415 (1973).
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power to extend additional discovery was a proper exercise of judi-
cial discretion. The Appellate Court disagreed, and held that the
approach taken by the trial judge was inconsistent with, and detri-
mental to, the rules governing misdemeanor prosecutions,4 and
emphasized the policy behind their adoption. The court stated that
the factors influencing the limitation of discovery rules in misde-
meanor cases were (1) the vast number and less serious nature of
these offenses necessitated a procedure by which they could be expe-
ditiously disposed of and, (2) adherence to the rules for limited
discovery would eliminate discretionary and diverse application of
the general discovery rules in the various courts of the state.,'
As a result of the Schmidt decision, defendants in misdemeanor
cases have a definite right to discovery, albeit such right is limited
in comparison to that available in felony prosecutions. However, in
the vast majority of quasi-criminal offenses, the defendant receives
much less protection than that afforded to defendants facing
charges for violations categorized as misdemeanors.
As previously stated, the majority of municipal ordinance viola-
tions do not impose penal sanctions upon conviction and therefore
remain unaffected by the 1970 amendment to the Municipal Code
which provided for application of criminal discovery rules where
possibility of imprisonment exists. Defendants prosecuted under
fine-only violations remain subject to the discretion by leave of
court rule. The problem lies in the fact that conduct which may be
characterized as a "quasi-criminal" offense under a municipal ordi-
nance may be labeled a misdemeanor if prosecution is brought
under a state statute.
For example, disorderly conduct is a common defense proscribed
under municipal ordinances and is punishable only by a fine; but,
under the state statute, this same offense is classified as a misde-
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 114-9 and 10; ch. 95V2, § 11-501(g) (1973).
42. People v. Schmidt, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 291 N.E.2d 225 (1972). See also People v. Fin-
ley, 21 Ill. App. 3d 335, 315 N.E.2d 299 (1974), where defendant, arrested for a similar offense,
claimed the right to civil discovery under terms of the Illinois Motor Vehicles Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 951/2, § 11.501.1(a) (1973), which provides:
such hearing shall proceed in the court in the same manner as other civil proceed-
ings.
The appellate court disagreed, citing Schmidt as authority for the proposition that automatic
application of criminal discovery rules would thwart the purpose of the 1971 misdemeanor
enactments. However, the court did not agree with the Schmidt decision regarding the issue
of discretionary application of civil discovery rules. A trial judge may authorize further civil
discovery upon a showing of good cause. Therefore, as the law now stands, defendants so
charged may seek extended discovery under the civil, but not the criminal discovery rules by
leave of court.
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meanor. In the former case, the defendant is entitled to absolutely
no discovery as a matter of right and may obtain the same only by
leave of court. Because misdemeanor prosecutions carry a possible
incarceration sanction upon conviction, however, a defendant
charged under the state statute is entitled to certain discovery de-
vices as a matter of right. 3
The sanction of imprisionment is the basis of distinction between
these two violations. Under a state charge, the defendant is there-
fore afforded more rights than a defendant facing the same offense
in violation of a municipal ordinance.
Quasi-Criminal Offenses
In City of Danville v. Hartshorn" the Supreme Court of Illinois
addressed itself, inter alia, to the issue of the defendant's right to
pre-trial discovery in a quasi-criminal prosecution. The defendant
faced charges for resisting arrest, a typical disorderly conduct viola-
tion.
The defendant's contention that he was entitled to pre-trial dis-
covery as a matter of right under the rules of the Civil Practice Act45
did not prevail. The court, unwilling to deviate from existing
appellate court decisions, reiterated the principle that ordinance
violations were civil in form, but criminal in character." The offense
carried only the imposition of a fine upon conviction, which placed
it firmly into the quasi-criminal category. The duality7 inherent in
the nature of the offense resulted in the denial of automatic applica-
tion of the discovery provisions of the Civil Practice Act.
The violation itself contains elements of both a civil and criminal
violation, but as neither statutory scheme is deemed to apply to
quasi-criminal offenses, the right of the defendant to obtain pre-
trial discovery in such cases is solely within the discretion of the trial
judge. 4
43. See note 34 supra.
44. 53 111. 2d 399, 292 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
45. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-100 (1973).
46. 53 Ill. 2d 399, 292 N.E.2d 382 (1973). This principle evolved from the following cases:
Waylor v. City of Galesburg, 56 fli. 285 (1870); Wiggins v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill. 372 (1873);
City of Chicago v. Joyce, 38 fll. 2d 368, 232 N.E. 2d 289 (1967).
47. The general scope of problems created by the dual nature of quasi-criminal prosecu-
tions is discussed in Comment, The Quasi-Criminal Ordnance Prosecution in Illinois, 68 Nw.
U.L. RFv. 566 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Quasi-Criminal Ordnance Prosecution]. The offen-
ses referred to as quasi-criminal are fine only and typically include disorderly conduct, prosti-
tution, housing code violations, vagrancy, etc.
48. This holding was in accord with People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill. 2d 171, 269
N.E.2d 1 (1971). The court determined that the automatic application of civil practice discov-
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The Hartshorn decision did little to erase the inequitites and
confusion generated by the peculiarity of these hybrid prosecutions.
It articulated no definitive standards or minimal guidelines by
which the determination of the trial judge's bounds of discretion
could be measured. It advanced no suggestions for an orderly proce-
dure under which future defendants could be assured of a fair and
unbiased avenue to procure the pre-trial information deemed requi-
site to an efficient and just disposition. Whereas under discovery
provisions governing both felonies and misdemeanors defendants
are guaranteed fixed rights with ascertainable limitations, it seems
incongruous to give defendants in quasi-criminal prosecutions no
discovery rights at all.
Defendants prosecuted for felonies are afforded discovery rights
pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules; they are entitled to the pro-
tections so provided. Defendants facing prosecutions for misde-
meanors and municipal ordinances where there are penal sanctions
imposed are given those rights to discovery as defined by the
Schmidt" decision. Conversely, when an offense falls within the
quasi-criminal category, the defendant may obtain discovery rights
only by leave of court. The need for protection of the defendant's
rights in such cases is superseded by the court's interest in expedi-
ent disposition of quasi-criminal cases. This is a decision of policy
which may be placing expediency before justice. Whether or not this
policy decision can be justified raises serious questions regarding a
quasi-criminal defendant's guarantees to due process and equal pro-
tection of the law.
THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISCRETIONARY DISCOVERY: THE
EQuAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS ISSUES
Equal Protection and due process overlap: legislation that is dis-
criminatory or otherwise violative of equality may amount to a
deprivation of due process. 5°
The due process restraints imposed upon the states through the
fourteenth amendment provide that no state may:
ery rules would not benefit the administration of justice in juvenile delinquency proceedings,
because the interests of the community must also be considered. Broadened discovery might
cause harrassment and intimidation of witnesses, suppression of evidence, etc.
49. 8 Ill. App. 2d 1024, 291 N.E.2d 225 (1974).
50. Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D. Hawaii 1956), reversed on other
grounds, 256 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1958).
1976]
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .. .1
This, in effect, stands for the proposition that there are certain
procedural as well as substantive requirements which must be met
in order to insure the constitutional guarantees to a fair trial.
The right to equal protection guarantees an individual that he
will be treated equally under the law, unless differential treatment
is based upon a reasonable classification justified by some legiti-
mate state interest. 52
The concepts of equal protection and due process stress that the
ultimate goal of our judicial system is to place every defendant in a
position of equality before the law.53 However, the quasi-criminal
classification of municipal offenses has placed a particular group of
defendants at a tremendous disadvantage. They have been denied
both the privileges available to civil litigants and the constitutional
protections available to criminal defendants in regard to the rights
of discovery.-
The question arises as to the legitimate interest of the state in
denying these defendants the discovery rights afforded automati-
cally to individuals under the civil and criminal rules. One factor
51. U. S. CONsT. amend. XIV. These protections are not limited to criminal prosecutions,
but extend to civil matters also. Williams v. Schaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1039 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). In Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971), Justice Douglas, in his concurring
opinion, stated that when fundamental civil liberties are involved, a court of appeals may
not inquire into the issue of whether an appeal may be fruitful. Prisoners who claimed denial
to access of law books were granted an appeal. The Court refused to uphold the state's
contention that in in forma pauperis proceedings, the state had a right to determine the merit
of an appeal. The Court reasoned that this would afford different treatment between wealthy
and indigent litigants thereby violating equal protection.
For application of due process principals in civil litigation see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971). There the Court relied on due process rather than equal protection in holding
that the State's having a monoply over the avenue by which divorce may be obtained, could
not deny an individual access to this procedure merely because she could not afford to pay
court costs. Justice Harlan emphasized that:
due process requires . . . persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty
through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
401 U.S. at 377.
Defendants in quasi-criminal prosecutions have no alternative but to seek judicial remedy.
Although the proceeding is regarded as civil in form, the penal aspects of these prosecutions
are most prominent. Discovery is available as a matter of right to both criminal defendants
and civil litigants, but not applicable to quasi-criminal prosecutions. This appears to contrav-
ene the due process requirement of equal opportunity to be heard.
52. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTTUTONAL LAw 288 (1972).
53. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
54. Quasi-Criminal Ordinance Prosecution, supra note 47. The comment points out that
the defendant may be subject to warrantless arrest, double jeopardy, lack of the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or delay of trial.
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influencing the establishment of the discovery by leave of court rule
is that the great volume of these offenses necessitates a procedure
by which cases may be disposed of expediently.15 The statistical
data available in support of this contention, however, leaves room
for considerable doubt as to whether this justification is indeed
valid."5
A second reason for adopting the rule of discretionary discovery
lies in the belief that the effect of convictions for quasi-criminal
violations are often regarded as less serious than those for criminal
offenses. Consequently, they should command less of the court's
time and attention. The fact that these offenses carry only the sanc-
tion of fines is often cited as a justification for this position. It
should be noted, however, that there are serious collateral conse-
quences which may result from a conviction for these offenses.
In Mayer v. City of Chicago,7 an indigent defendant wished to
55. People v. Finley, 21 Ill. App. 3d 335, 315 N.E.2d 229 (1974); People v. Schmidt, 8 Ill.
App. 3d 1024, 291 N.E.2d 225 (1972).
56. In 1973, there were 266,653 misdemeanors and ordinance violations in the City of
Chicago. A DECADE OF PROGRESS, ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, 154 (1973). The method of disposition of a vast
majority of these did not result in a determination by trial. Actually, of these 266,653 viola-
tions 235,889 were dismissed for various reasons: Discharged: 25,813; D.W.P.: 35,986; Leave
to File Denied: 98,993; Non-Suit: 24,153; Nolle Prosqui: 8,444; Stricken Off-Leave to Rein-
state: 41,933; Other: 566. The cases that resulted in sentences consisted of 10,844 misdemean-
ors and 21,920 ordinance violations. Together, they comprised roughly 13% of those violations
originally recorded.
There is no data compiled regarding the number of these 30,764 cases which actually went
to trial. The defendant may merely plead guilty and receive a sentence.
The number of actual trials cannot be determined but the number of these cases in which
leave to appeal was filed was only 100. This figure was obtained with the help of Mr. Dominick
Grieco, supervisor in the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County. This figure
bears margin for error as its finding necessitated a search through several hundred pages of
the appellate record of Branch 91 Appeals-Circuit Court of Cook County-Municipal Division,
January, 1973 - December, 1973. Of these, only 10 were appeals of city disorderly convictions,
while the remaining 90 consisted of separate cases brought against repeated offenders under
the City of Chicago's obscenity ordinance.
Although figures for actual trials are unavailable, the fact that there were only 100 appeals,
only 10 of which involve the city disorderly statute, Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code ch. 193
(1973), shows that the prophesy of judicial overload if full discovery were permitted in quasi-
criminal prosecutions may be unfounded.
The costs of discovery are prohibitive. The expedient disposal of the majority of these
prosecutions will not be affected by allowing those individuals with meritorious claims of
innocence access to discovery.
The quasi-criminal classification has resulted in a needless restriction upon the scope of
di3covery as both the civil and criminal discovery provisions have inherent limitations and
the trial judge may also deny discovery motions where there is no showing of relevancy or
good cause.
57. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
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appeal a conviction on two counts of disorderly conduct which re-
sulted in a fine of $500. He moved for free transcripts on the basis
of his indigency, but this motion was denied because the rule for
acquisition of such transcripts was held applicable solely to felony
cases.
58
The defendant contended that the rule was an unconstitutional
violation of his fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection
and due process of law, as it denied him an equal right to seek
appellate review.5" The Supreme Court of the United States af-
firmed this contention:
The distinction between felony and nonfelony offenses drawn by
rule 607(b) can no more satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment than could the like distinction in the Wisconsin law,
held invalid in Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971), which
permitted a change of venue in felony but not in misdemeanor
trials. 60
In addition, the Court recognized that there are other effects
which may occur as a consequence of convictions for petty offenses
which should not be minimized. The imposition of a fine may be a
great burden upon an individual who can ill-afford to pay it. It may
lead to difficulties in obtaining future employment, and to embar-
rassment or jeopardy in a present job if garnishment proceedings are
instituted. These consequences raise serious due process considera-
tions.
There is no constitutional right to discovery. It is, rather, a privi-
lege bestowed upon the parties to a judicial proceeding by legislative
enactment. The rights accorded the citizens of the state, however,
may not arbitrarily be denied to a specific class of persons. There
are relevant constitutional restraints which restrict the power of the
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 607(b) (1969). This rule provided that:
In any case in which the defendant is convicted of a felony, he may petition the
court. . for a report of proceedings at his trial.
This rule was amended in 1971 to apply to all defendants facing possible imprisonment for
more than six months. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 607(b)(1973).
59. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the United States Supreme Court held that
there was no logical relationship between the guilt or innocence of a defendant and his ability
to bear the burden of trial costs. See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
60. 404 U.S. at 195-96. The value of transcripts as a discovery device and the right of any
defendant to obtain them for purposes of appeal is illustrated by the following decisions. In
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), Justice Douglas stated in dissent that the
transcript of a prior mistrial is of value to the defendant as a discovery device in trial
preparation and for use at trial for the impeachment of witnesses. 404 U.S. at 228. See also
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1965), where a law requiring only unsuccessful appellants to
pay for transcripts was a violation of equal protection.
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state to extinguish an entitlement whether it is classified a right or
a privilege.6 '
Both the possibility of property loss in the nature of penal fines,
and the far-reaching, adverse consequences which result from con-
viction of a quasi-criminal offense indicate that defendants are de-
nied procedural due process whenever their rights to present an
adequate defense are abridged by discretionary denial of requested
discovery devices.
In addition, the Court in Mayer also emphasized that laws which
allow defendants to experience discriminatory treatment at trial
produce a general hostility toward the courts of the state. The Study
Committee on Quasi-Criminal Cases recognized the fact that arbi-
trary and discriminatory application of discovery by leave of court
is prevalent throughout the State.2 Judges may grant some defen-
dants discovery devices under the civil and/or criminal rules while
categorically denying others any form of discovery.
Statutes conferring different rights upon defendants predicated
solely upon mere categories of offenses have been held invalid by the
Supreme Court of the United States on both due process and equal
protection grounds.
Twenty years ago, an indigent defendant in Illinois could obtain
free transcripts for purposes of appeal only upon the condition he
first be sentenced to death. 3 This law, and many others similar in
principle64 have since been held unconstitutional. A mere classifica-
tion is insufficient justification to deny an individual his full rights
under the judicial process.
In City of Chicago v. Mayer, 5 the defendant, a third-year medical
student, was convicted of disorderly conduct under a municipal
ordinance for interfering with a police officer in the performance of
his duty. The conduct in question consisted of his refusal, both
verbal and physical, to allow a police officer to move an injured
man.
On appeal, the defendant asserted that there was reversible error
in the trial judge's refusal to tender certain self-defense instructions
61. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
62. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
63. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), where defendant claimed Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 65, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.65 (1955), violated his equal protection and due
process rights.
64. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Guinn and Beal v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
65. 56 Ill. 2d 336, 308 N.E.2d 601 (1974).
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to the jury,6 which would have been available to the defendant as
a matter of right under the criminal code, but were held inapplica-
ble to municipal disorderly prosecutions."
The Supreme Court of Illinois, finding for the defendant, refused
to accept the argument that the instruction should not be available
to defendants facing charges for non-penal violations. By the court's
reasoning, if such a defense were available to one who committed a
serious crime, there was absolutely no logical basis upon which to
forbid its use of a defendant facing charges for a violation less seri-
ous in nature.
Applying this same reasoning to the issue of discovery, is there
any rational basis to refuse the use of discovery devices to quasi-
criminal defendants when, under a municipal statute, only the pen-
alty is considered less serious in nature and not the offense itself?
If this same offense was prosecuted under the state statute prohibit-
ing disorderly conduct, the defendant would be entitled to auto-
matic application of discovery rights pursuant to the rule governing
misdemeanors. Under the quasi-criminal rule however, he is enti-
tled to only those discovery benefits conferred by the court. In this
situation defendants accused of the same prohibited conduct, are
afforded different treatment under the law. The Illinois legislature
and courts, having established the right to discovery, appear to be
violating the rights of defendants in quasi-criminal prosecutions on
the basis of a mere classification."
At the very least, due process implies that a defendant is entitled
to reciprocity. The state should not be allowed to assume an advan-
tageous position in preparing its case against him.
It was on the basis of this principle that the Supreme Court in
Wardius v. Oregon"9 ruled that the due process clause of the four-
66. Instructions tendered by the defendant but refused, were based upon ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 7-13 (1971), reading as follows:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity
of the accused was without blame in occasioning. . . the situation and reasonably
believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than
the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct.
67. 56 Ill. 2d 366, 308 N.E.2d 601 (1974). Only those municipal ordinances enacted under
section 1-2-1.1 of the Municipal Code or section 6(e) of Article VII of the Constitution are
considered to be violations of penal statutes. Id.
68. See Williams v. Oklahoma, 395 U.S. 458 (1969).
This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of
appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues
must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal
access to the courts.
69. 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973).
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teenth amendment 0 required that the state's alibi rule provide re-
ciprocal discovery rights. The Court, in recognition of the important
role liberal discovery plays in perpetuating justice stated:
In absence of a strong showing of state interest to the contrary,
discovery must be a two-way street.7
The rule of discretionary discovery in quasi-criminal cases in
Illinois fails to incorporate this minimal due process requirement.
Theoretically, under the standardless discretionary discovery rule,
the state may be permitted to obtain discovery while the same
request made by the defendant is subject to denial. Justice is want-
ing when an individual is subject to judicial proceedings stripped of
his constitutional safeguards.
CONCLUSION
There are definite constitutional limitations upon the power of
the state to terminate certain rights or privileges of its citizens.72 In
order to do so, there must be some legitimate state interest, the
value of which outweighs any incidental infringements upon equal
protection or due process rights.73
Quasi-criminal offenders are, as a class, being denied these basic
rights. The state of the law regarding discovery rules in Illinois as
applied to quasi-criminal prosecutions is undefined and subject to
arbitrary application, placing these defendants in a disadvantaged
position before the law. The state cannot justify a constitutional
infringement by placing expediency before justice, especially when
there is doubt as to the merit of the claim of expediency.74
There is no legitimate reason to deny defendants charged with
fine-only violations at least the same minimum discovery rights
available to defendants in cases of misdemeanors. Quasi-criminal
violations are criminal in nature. An individual prosecuted under
this classification does not face the possibility of imprisonment, but
this basis of distinction cannot be justified in light of the adverse
consequences which may result from conviction of a quasi-criminal
offense. These defendants should not be denied the opportunity to
protect their interests in judicial proceedings. An absolute right to
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
71. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 (1973).
72. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
73. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
74. It seems unlikely that full discovery would lead to a substantial increase in the num-
ber of trials for quasi-criminal prosecutions. The expense of litigation is a factor which a
defendant with little merit to his claim of innocence will surely consider.
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dicovery as provided for in misdemeanor prosecutions seems the
best solution to this problem; defendants in quasi-criminal cases
should not be treated unequally in the eyes of the law when the
conduct constituting an offense is identical, but merely the form of
punishment differs.
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